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GOLDBERG v. KUNZ
attend; and, having appeared at the time he originally in-
tended, he found another claiming his seat. Being con-
sidered the wrongdoer, he was subjected to insulting and
humiliating language and ejected "in utter disregard of
his rights". Damages were granted for such insult and
humiliation. 7 Now, upon examination of such cases, it is
found that such insult does not flow from the breach of
contract alone. The insult for which damages were given
as compensation was the insult following from the addi-
tional conduct of the proprietor and servants extrinsic to
the contract and its breach. Hence, such damages do not
compensate for an injury flowing from the breach and
should not be considered as damages recovered for breach
of the contract. Such cases are analogous to those involving
the use of excessive force in ejecting a trespasser. The thing
compensated for in such cases is the unnecessary insult.
Dean Prosser recognizes that from these cases there is
developing the new tort of "insult".48
The Court of Appeals has left the question of damages
for breach of contract of admission wide open, saying: "We
see no reason for declining to follow the rule (of the Mar-
rone case), especially when no question of breach of con-
tract or specific performance is involved."4 What course
the Court will take remains to be seen. The clause on a
ticket limiting the damages to a refund of its purchase
price presents no solution as the Court could easily render
such clause ineffectual by holding it not a fair estimate of
damages that would result from the contract's breach.
PARKING LOT - BAILMENT -THEFT BY EMPLOYEE
Goldberg v. Kunz1
The defendant operated a garage and parking lot where
the plaintiff stored his car for ten days. The keys to the
car were left with the defendant who promised to let no
one have them. The following Sunday an employee, about
whom the defendant knew very little, was left in full
charge of the lot and garage. The employee took the car
from the garage and went on a frolic of his own which
resulted in damage to the automobile. The defendant's
1 Metts v. Charleston Theater Co., 105 S. C. 19, 89 S. . 389 (1916)
Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, supra, n. 35.
"PRosssm, TORTS (1941) 59, et seq.
Supra, n. 1, 337.
1 185 Md. 492, 45 A. 2d 279 (1946).
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motion for a directed verdict was refused, and the jury
found the defendant negligent in hiring the employee and
rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
held the transaction was a bailment and that it was the
duty of the defendant to use ordinary care in hiring a
trustworthy servant. It was further held that the bailor
has made out a prima facie case when he has established
the bailment and an unauthorized use or misdelivery by
the bailee. However, the decision in favor of the plaintiff
was based solely on the negligence of the defendant in
hiring the servant and in entrusting him with the care of
the premises. The Court expressly negatived the idea that
it in any way dealt with the possibly broader basis of
liability grounded on a breach of the defendant's under-
taking, and pointed out that other jurisdictions are in
conflict regarding such liability.
In the instant case the automobile was probably kept
in the garage of the bailee instead of on his parking lot,
but the only distinction between a garage and a parking
lot for the purpose of determining the existence of a bail-
ment is in the possible differences in the manner of con-
ducting the business.2
Where the automobile owner surrenders his key to the
lot attendant, or leaves it in his car at the express or implied
request of the lot attendant, there is sufficient delivery of
possession and a bailment exists.3 Or if the key is left in
the car with the lot attendant's knowledge and acqui-
escence, a bailment may be created.' Nor does the fact
that the car owner has a definite place in which he parks
every night preclude the relationship from being a bail-
ment if the key is left at the attendant's request.' The
relationship may start as a bailment and end as a mere
license, e.g., the bailor delivered his car and the keys to
the defendant bailee and both agreed at the time that since
the bailee was in the habit of leaving the lot at five-thirty
each afternoon, if the bailor had not returned by that time
then the bailee would place the keys above the sun-visor
of the automobile and leave; the Court held there was a
constructive re-delivery of possession and control to the
2 Jones, The Parkig Lot Cases (1938) 27 Geo. L. J. 162; See Annot.
(1930) 65 A. L. R. 431 and (1940) 131 A. L. R. 1175.
"Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933) ; Beetson v. Holly-
wood Athletic Club, 109 Cal. App. 715, 293 P. 821 (1930) ; Westchester
Development Corporation v. Burkett, 38 A. 2d 628 (D. C. 1944) : see also,
Note, Liability of Parking Lot Owner for Stolen Car (1939) 37 Mich. L.
Rev. 468.
'Doherty v. Drnst, supra, n. 3.
Westchester Development Corp. v. Burkett, supra, n. 3.
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bailor at five-thirty and the defendant was not liable for
the theft of the car which occurred after that time.'
When it is understood that the automobile owner must
surrender a claim check or ticket, or must in some other
manner identify himself before he can reclaim his auto-
mobile, a bailment usually is found to exist, even when
the key is retained by the owner who locks his car or not
as he sees fit.' However, receipt of a check or ticket from
the lot attendant in itself is not conclusive of a baliment,
when the keys are retained by the car owner, if circum-
stances warrant a finding that it is not intended to be a
claim check, but is meant to be a receipt for the payment
of a fee for the license to park.' When it appears that
nearly all of the cars parking on the lot will be arriving
and leaving at the same time, and the number of employees
in relationship to the number of cars makes delivery to the
lot attendant and re-delivery to the automobile owner im-
practicable, it may be considered apparent that the ticket
is not meant as a claim check but is intended as a receipt
for the payment of the parking feeY However, even where
such circumstances exist, it may be possible to find some
duty owed by the lot owner to the automobile owner
during the period when no cars are entering or leaving
based on a contract to guard the cars. In order to establish
such a duty there would have to exist an express contract
to guard, or an implied contract based upon the manner
of conducting the business and the circumstances of the
case, taking into consideration the degree of enclosure, the
manner in which it is guarded, and the disclosed practice
of prohibiting any one from leaving with an automobile
during this guarded period without proper identification
and proof of the right to remove the car. On the other
hand, it is possible to argue that a bailment exists by
constructive delivery at the time the lot keeper begins
to exercise such control and that there is a constructive
re-delivery of such control when the guarded period ends
and the people are allowed to remove their cars en masse
without consulting the lot keeper. However, the contract
Continental Insurance Company v. Himbert, 37 So. 2d 605 (La. 1948).
General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Service Parking Grounds, 254 Mich. 1,
235 N. W. 898 (1931) ; Galowltz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. S.
421 (1924) ; U Drive & Tour v. System Auto Parks, 28 Cal. App. Supp. 2d
782, 71 P. 2d 354 (1937).
' Ex Parte Mobile Light and R. Company, 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177
(1924) : Porter v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 40 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 840, 105
P. 2d 956 (1940).
"Ex Parte Mobile Light and R. Co., 8upra, n. 8, a parking lot catering
to the patrons of a nearby baseball park.
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theory seems to be the sounder theory for imposing lia-
bility in such a case. In Goodyear Clearwater Mills v.
Wheeler"0 the Court split on the question with the majority
calling the transaction a bailment while the dissent held
that a contract to guard was the only basis upon which lia-
bility could be imposed. In that case the defendant was
the manager of a large plant which maintained a fully
enclosed parking lot with one gate at which a guard was
stationed; the cars were allowed to enter and exit freely
during the changes of the working shifts of employees,
but during the interim period between shift changes, the
lot was closed and guarded.
Where the lot owner exercises no control over the auto-
mobile, letting the car owner take the keys and permitting
him to lock the car or not as he desires, and where the
parties contemplate that the car owner may enter the lot
and remove the car at will without consulting the attendant
first, generally no bailment is found to exist." A license
to park appears to indicate more accurately the nature of
this relationship than does a lease of space.12 The lease
theory is more plausible where one habitually parks his
car in the same space every day or night. 3 Under these
circumstances if attendants are present, it is usually only
for the purpose of collecting fees and directing traffic. 4
But even here the courts might uphold the express con-
tract, actually made between the lot attendant and the
car owner, to guard the car against theft. 5
1049 S. E. 2d 184 (Ga. 1948).
" Suits v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W.
656 (1923) ; Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n., 95 Okla. 294, 219 P. 713
(1923) ; Ex Parte Mobile Light and R. Co., supra, n. 8.
'Note, Liability of Parking Lot Operators for Theft of Aistomnobiles
(1934) 18 Minn. L. Rev. 352.
Jones, supra, n. 2.
' Ex Parte Mobile Light and R. Co., supra, n. 2.
'8Pennroyal Fair Ass'n. v. Hite, 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046 (1922) ; this
case also discusses the authority of an attendant to make such a contract.
It is not within the scope of this casenote to deal with the problem of lia-
bility for the theft of chattels left in tile car. However, tlhe case of Hesse
v. Auto City Parking Company, Superior Court of Baltimore City (O'Dnne,
J.) D. R., Nov. 30, 1944, is worthy of note. Plaintiff parked his car con-
taining valuable electrical tools in the trunk and a radio on the back seat
and informed the attendant of the presence of these articles. He left his
car keys with the attendant at the latter's request. The car and the tools
and radio were stolen and the defendant lot owner admitted liability for the
car but not for the tools and radio. The Court held that to impose
liability on the lot owner for chattels left in the car, he must have actual
or constructive notice of the presence of such items. Thus where the chat-
tels are visible, or the car owner informs the attendant of their presence
the lot owner assumes liability for them. See also. Lucas v. Auto City Park-
ing Co., 62 A- 2d 557 (D. C. 1948), and note, Unknown Chattcls Contained
in Object Bailed (1947) 45 Mich. L. Rev. 625.
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Thus it becomes apparent that the nature of the relation-
ship existing between the owner of the parking lot and the
owner of the automobile who parks his car thereon is
determined by the manner in which the parking lot busi-
ness is conducted.16
Where a bailment exists the lot owner may attempt
to avoid responsibility by a limitation of liability posted
on the lot or printed on the check given to the car owner.
However, it is frequently held that a bailee cannot exempt
himself from liability for his own negligence.' Further-
more, the parking lot owner or garage keeper cannot limit
the nature of his liability by posting a sign to that effect
or by printing such a stipulation on the ticket or check
given to the bailor unless such limitations are specifically
called to the attention of the bailor."5
By establishing the existence of a bailment and the
failure of the bailee to return the car, or its delivery in a
damaged condition, the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case against the defendant and a presumption that
the injury or loss was caused by the bailee's negligence
is raised. Most cases do not allow the bailee to overcome
this presumption by merely showing that the car was
stolen, but impose the burden on the bailee of proving
that the theft occurred without any fault on his part.'9
Thus the bailee must prove that he was not negligent in
guarding the car against theft. The protection afforded the
car must be commensurate with the danger of theft to
which the car is exposed by virtue of the location of the
parking lot, the degree to which it is enclosed, and other
relevant circumstances including the furnishing of suffi-
cient employees to supervise adequately the cars on the
lot.20 This rule, placing the burden on the defendant to
Osborn v. Cline, 263 N. Y. 434. 189 N. E. 483 (1934).
"Malone v. Santora, 64 A. 2d 51 (Conn., 1949; but 8ee, RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 574, 575.
11Hesse v. Auto City Parking Company, supra, n. 15; note, Effect of
Attempt to contract Away Liability for Negligence (1948) 17 Cinn. L.
Rev. 305. Notice on the ticket that there would be no attendant on duty
after 6 P. M. does not relieve defendant of liability for theft after 6 P. M.
If defendant expressly Informed plaintiff, or If plnintiff actually knew, It
would be evidence to consider in defendant's favor, Sandler v. Common-
wealth Station Co., 30 N. E. 2d 389 (Mass. 1940).
19 Jones, supra, n. 2. Contra, Castorina v. Rosen, 290 N. Y. 445, 49 N. E.
2d 521 (1943).
mRhodes v. Turner, 171 S. W. 2d 208 (Tex., 1943). In Kaiser v. Poche,
194 So. 464 (La., 1940), the Court held that If the keys are left In the
car, a greater degree of care must be exercised than when the key Is left
in the possession of the attendant. In Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian,
170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 1018 (1938), where the key was left with
the car but plaintiff knew the cars were left unguarded most of the time,
held a ballment but that the plaintiff assented by implication to the limited
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prove that he used due care, has been described as a rule
of necessity since the car owner hardly can be expected
to know what happened to his automobile while it was in
the charge of the bailee. The bailee, on the other hand,
should be expected to account for such loss or damage
and to come forward with evidence to establish due care
on his part or to show that the loss or damage occurred
despite such due care.2
When the theft is by an employee of the bailee, all courts
agree that the bailee is liable if he was negligent in employ-
ing or entrusting the servant, or in retaining him after
having reason to be distrustful of him.22 Again, the courts
place the burden on the bailee to prove that he was free
from negligence and allow the bailor to make out a prima
facie case by showing that the theft or unauthorized use
which caused the damage was by a servant of the bailee.23
Although there is much authority for the position that
the bailee is not liable for the theft or unauthorized use of
the subject of the bailment by his employee without the
bailee's connivance or negligence,24 many cases are contra.-'
The cases holding the employer where the damage to the
stored vehicle is caused by an act of the employee not in
supervision. In this case, the car owner was not required to consult the
lot owner before removing his car. In Loeb v. Whitten, 49 S. E. 2d 785
(Ga. 1948), the Court said safety measures to protect the car must be
taken in advance to prevent the possibility of theft by providing sufficient
enclosure if only a few employees are to be kept. The bailee's persistent
but futile attempts to stop a thief as he was leaving with the car was
not enough, the Court stating, "the defendant here did too little and did
that too late."
2Quinn v. Milner, 34 A. 2d 259 (D. C. 1943). In Galowitz v. Magner,
aupra, n. 7, the Court said that the fact that the thief got past the attendant
without presenting a claim check infers negligence on the part of the
bailee. For a contrary view, see Davis v. Harsdorff, 207 S. W. 2d 424
(Tex. 1948), which held that when the loss resulted from fire or theft,
the burden is on the bailor to prove the bailee negligent.
SHolmes v. First National Bank, 101 N. J. L. 401, 128 A. 150 (N. J., 1925).
Medes v. Hornbach, 56 D. C. App. 13, 6 F. 2d 711, 712 (1925). The
mere fact that an employee came well recommended is generally not
enough to relieve defendant unless the defendant made an ample investi-
gation of the servant before hiring him, Ca.torinua v. Rosen. 3,8 N. Y. S.
2d 753 (1942). The fact that the employee was once in jail for intoxication
is not evidence of negligence in hiring, Argonne Apartment Home (V. Garri-
son, 59 D. C. App. 370, 42 F. 2d 605 (1930). Quacrc, if the servant actually
had a good record, could the bailee by proving the previous good record show
that his lack of due care in hiring was not 'the proximate cause of the loss
or injury?
4 Medes v. Hornbach, supra, n. 23; Barclay, Inc. v. Maxfteld. 48 A. 2d
768 (D. C. 1946) ; Holmes v. First National Bank, supra, n. 22; Castorina
v. Rosen, sapra, n. 19.
"Maynard v. James, 109 Conn. 365, 146 A. 614 (Conn., 1929); Grenada
Bank v. Moore, 131 Miss. 339, 95 So. 449 (1923) ; Muehlebach v. Paso Robles
Springs Hotel Company, 65 Cal. App. 634, 225 P. 19 (1924) ; Corbett v.
Smeraldo, 91 N. J. L. 29, 102 A. 889 (1918).
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the scope of his employment, and where the bailee has
adequately proven himself free from negligence do so on
the theory that this is a breach of a positive duty to protect
the car, a duty which the bailee has undertaken to perform
through his servant. This duty of safe return is one im-
posed by the bailee's contract, from which he cannot by
his own conduct, much less by shifting the responsibility
to his servant, release himself, and the liability in such
a case grows out of the fact that the bailee has failed to
do the thing he agreed to do.26 The bailee is in a position
to supervise and select his employees and should do so
with the degree of particularity commensurate with the
great value of the automobile which the employees are to
control, and with an eye to the enticing nature of the auto-
mobile and the facility with which a servant can remove
it from the garage or lot. The bailee should be forced to
choose between minimizing the risk by paying larger
salaries to induce better employees to work for him or
to bear the greater risk of a contrary course of conduct.
It seems more proper that the risk should be placed upon
the bailee who selects the servant and has a chance to
supervise his actions than upon the bailor who has no con-
trol whatsoever over the methods of management used.
The risk should properly be a risk of the business and
not of the bailor.
The courts adopting the contrary view contend that
those who hold the bailee responsible are injecting an
unusual term into the contract of bailment inconsistent
with the liability usually incident to the bailment relation-
ship.27 They point out that a master is liable only for the
servant's tortious acts done within the scope of his employ-
ment and that a bailee is not an insurer."8 The instant
Maryland case bases the defendant's liability on negligence
and expressly leaves open the question of holding the
defendant liable on any broader basis.
2 Bowles v. Payne, 251 S. W. 101 (Mo. 1923) ; Castorina v. Rosen, supra,
n. 23, reversed by the Court of Appeals, supra, n. 19.
rl Firemen's Fund In. Co. v. Schreiber, 150 Wis. 42, 135 N. W. 507 (1912).
Note, Liability of Garage Keeper for Wrongful Act of Servant Out8ide
Scope of Employment (1943) 29 Corn. L. Q. 94, noting Castorina v. Rosen,
supra, n. 19.
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